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In a speech to the United Nations General Assembly in September 1999, Secretary-General 
Kofi Annan addressed the gap that had developed between traditional interpretations of the UN 
Charter and evolving humanitarian practice, in which member states had gradually begun to 
recognise further limits to state sovereignty. In direct response to the inaction of the Security 
Council in Rwanda, and its division in the case of Kosovo, Kofi Annan (1999) argued that, ‘In 
both cases, the UN should have been able to find common ground in upholding the principles 
of the charter, and acting in defence of our common humanity’. Implicit in Annan’s assessment 
of the previous moral failings of the UN, is the assumption that the defence of “humanity” itself 
can and should act as a central guiding principle for UN member states. In response, Annan 
(1999) argued the case for a ‘new commitment to humanitarian action’ that needed to be 
‘universal, irrespective of region or nation’ and underpinned by a ‘broader definition of 
national interest’. Central to this new approach was the need for Security Council action to now 
be ‘answerable to a higher authority, that of morality’, in order to reject the absolutism of 
traditional sovereignty (Hopgood 2014, p. 190). Consequently, it is this recognition of a distinct 
moral concern for the threat posed by mass atrocity crimes to a collective humanity, which 
would prove central to the original framing of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) within the 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) report. However, the 
extent to which recognition of the moral plight of our common humanity can be used to ground 
state consensus, and how this triggers when the international community should intervene on 




The philosophical and moral foundations of humanity’s relationship to the R2P have for a long 
time remained a largely overlooked element of the R2P literature. Despite the language of 
humanity and appeals to it being a consistent feature in a wide range of R2P scholarship, from 
Nicholas Wheeler (2005) questioning if the R2P is ‘A victory for common humanity?’ to Peter 
Hilpold’s (2012) framing of the R2P as ‘Intervening in the name of humanity’, it is most often 
the case that humanity’s normative status and value is one left assumed and / or unexplored. 
This appears strikingly at odds with the significant normative weight both scholars and 
diplomats continue to place on the concept of humanity, and the metaphysical heavy lifting 
they assume the word can provide to any moral argument. This can be illustrated in a number 
of examples, including Ramesh Thakur’s (2015, p. 23) conceptualisation of the R2P as being 
one underpinned by ‘our common humanity’, and hence demanding ‘an acceptance of a duty 
of care by all of us who live in zones of safety towards all those who are trapped in zones of 
danger’; as well as Gareth Evans (2008), who suggests that ‘the case for R2P rests simply on 
our common humanity’. Thus, as Maja Zehfuss (2012, p. 862) has argued, ‘most often 
“humanity” is not considered a category in need of explanation’, leading to the assumption that 
‘it self-evidently deserves protection’. In both these examples, the concept of humanity 
provides the central philosophical principle underpinning the moral weight of their arguments, 
yet the concept is presented without further comment, and simply taken as an uncontested truth. 
 
Whilst more recent scholarship has looked to fill this void, such as an International Politics 
special issue on ‘The Responsibility to Protect 10 years on from the World Summit (2016)’, 
focusing more specifically on the relationship between humanity and the R2P, there still 
remains a tendency to overlook the complexities of humanity’s moral foundations and its 
subsequent impact on the framing and construction of the R2P. One can highlight this oversight 
within the special issue, whereby the concept of common humanity is most often utilised as a 
 
	  
theoretical benchmark in which to measure the current progress of the R2P. In this sense, the 
focus often concerns ‘whether the Responsibility to Protect promotes a common humanity’ 
(Waldorf 2016, p. 50); or the extent to which the R2P can represent an ‘expression of common 
humanity’ (Newman 2016, p. 32). Thus, rather than analyse the R2P as simply an attempt to 
live up to or put into practice the universal value of humanity, one must further interrogate the 
points of contestation within this relationship, in particular, the extent to which states recognise 
the link made between humanity’s role in identifying collective harm and its ability to then 
motivate action through the framework of the R2P. 
 
In light of this lacuna, it is necessary to ask what this theoretical oversight means for on-going 
debates about the R2P as well as our ability to still talk of a “common humanity”. First of all, 
the lack of critical engagement with the concept of humanity has to some extent clouded 
normative judgements concerning both the centrality of humanity to the R2P’s motivational 
capacity as well as its relation to issues of moral progress. The relative speed in which the R2P 
concept has moved from a loose abstract framework to an idea recognised by all states in the 
2005 World Summit Outcome Document (WSOD) has thus been central to reinforcing the 
beliefs of many advocates that ‘the normative arguments about R2P are largely won’ (Bellamy 
2015). However, this conflation between the R2P’s normative progression and the relative 
progress of our collective humanity is at times misplaced. In addressing this oversight the 
chapter will examine the extent to which the recognition of a moral demand for protection, 
founded in the idea of a collective harm to humanity, can in fact influence states to take action 
on behalf of others. Through this more critical engagement on the relationship between 
humanity and R2P, the chapter highlights the significant contestation that still exists, in terms 
of how the moral demands founded in the R2P compete with the everyday constraints of 




In order to break down this complex relationship the chapter is structured around two key 
questions. Firstly, how does the concept of humanity underpin the moral claims that are central 
to the identification of universal ‘human wrongs’ (Booth 1999, p. 56)? In response to this 
question, the next section will focus on how to distinguish various aspects of humanity in order 
to ground our understanding of the distinctly human harm created by mass atrocity crimes. 
Building upon this theoretical outline, the chapter will secondly examine how the concept of 
humanity is used to underpin the moral and ethical framework of the R2P. In addressing this 
question, the chapter will analyse the key moral obligations created by the concept of humanity, 
and assess how these obligations have helped to inform and construct the central motivational 
qualities of the R2P. Through tracing the R2P’s chronological emergence, alongside its 
engagement with the concept of humanity, the section will demonstrate how states have 
continued to challenge the link made between humanity’s role in locating collective harm, and 
the subsequent call for humanity to be protected. The chapter will then conclude by 
highlighting the need to more critically engage with the normative tensions at play in the R2P 
concept, thus opening up space for a significant reassessment of how we qualify the ability of 
new humanitarian concepts such as the R2P to reflect moral progress and change.  
 
Grounding the Concept of Humanity 
In order to clarify the distinct characteristics that make up our understanding of what constitutes 
the idea of harm to humanity, the chapter will first focus on two specific complimentary 
characteristics often used by philosophers in their examinations of humanity, namely 
humanness and humankind. Through exploring these dual characteristics, it will be possible to 
reflect on how both are essential elements in how we frame and categorise the crimes that are 
considered of greatest harm to us collectively. As Matthew Weinert (2015, p. 25) argues, 
 
	  
notions of humanity are not simply used as ‘diplomatic or academic flourishes’ but can in fact 
be seen to ‘exert influence on polices and ways of thinking about contemporary international 
relations’. This section will therefore help to demonstrate why there remains a need to further 
develop greater conceptual clarity on the diverse, yet central, elements of humanity, so as to 
better understand its moral significance in relation to categorising ‘conscious shocking crimes’ 
(Heinze 2009, p. 33).  
 
Humanity can firstly be interpreted as referring to the quality of being human, encapsulated as 
what philosophers often call humanness. Humanity is thus the essence of what makes us 
human, which must be seen as an abstract property, rather than the human race or a set of 
individuals (Luban 2004, p. 90). In other words, there are certain basic values that are 
considered inherent to all human beings, such as a form of shared human dignity and our 
collective diversity as a species (Renzo 2012; Bauman 2001, p. 136). The consequence of this 
reading of humanity implies that there is something fundamental to being human and how we 
define these elements of humanness has a profound impact on our overall understanding of the 
concept of humanity.  
 
Consequently, when we talk about a crime committed against humanity, we are often 
insinuating that the very basic moral sensibilities that are instinctive to human beings are 
challenged, and thus the foundations of human worth are directly under attack (Gyekye 2004). 
In this sense, we can also conceptualise humanness in terms of its relation to dehumanisation 
(Haslam 2006), whereby our ability to locate practices of dehumanisation, such as defining 
others as cockroaches instead of humans, helps to reinforce the value of recognising a shared 
humanness. We must therefore understand humans as having ‘capacities which non-humans 
do not and which humans consider being so significant, as to make them the basis of an 
 
	  
appropriate moral practice’ (Parekh 1999, p. 147). The collective status of humanness is thus 
defined through ‘individuals possessing certain species-specific capabilities’, reinforcing the 
need to treat humans in a certain manner, not as inanimate objects (Parekh 1999, p. 147). The 
notion of humanness therefore allows us to set moral limits as to the categorisation of universal 
human wrongs (Booth 1999, p. 56), which can be seen to represent a direct affront to the human 
qualities we are all deemed to share.  
 
In contrast, humanity can also be referred to as simply humankind, meaning the aggregation of 
all human beings. This requires the ability to accept that as human beings we all belong to one 
collective group and that this allows us to have interconnections with human beings as a whole. 
It is through greater identification with distant people that we can then expand our recognition 
of harm and therefore draw ‘serious violations of human rights to the attention of a worldwide 
public’ (Linklater 2009, p. 490). Thus, we can view crimes against humanity as crimes that not 
only harm the direct victim and their humanness, but also all human beings in the process 
(Renzo 2012, p. 449). The collective element of this understanding of humanity is based on the 
fact that we are all members of a human species, living in the confines of the planet, by which 
we are both constrained and interconnected by this reality. Whilst it is difficult to argue that 
we are all directly violated by acts that supposedly “stain the conscience of humanity”, by 
referring to humankind one can suggest that a significant group representing human beings as 
a species has been directly affected as a singular body (Geras 2011, p. 49). Furthermore, if we 
assume that groups can be assigned responsibility as well as be the victim of harm, one can 
view certain acts as violating key interests of that group, for example, attacks on the diversity 
of culture and people; whereby humanity arguably has an interest in the maintenance of its 




Whilst both categorisations prove useful in breaking down different elements of what we often 
refer to as our common humanity, it is important to note that the two interpretations do not 
exist independently of one another. It is often the case that when people refer to humanity they 
interpret its existence as containing elements of both humankind and humanness. One can see 
this in a statement by Geoffrey Robertson (1999, p. 220), who claims that crimes against 
humanity ‘diminish every member of the human race’. Implicit in this claim is the suggestion 
that certain crimes not only concern the whole of the human race, in regard to a collective 
understanding of humanity, but that these actions directly challenge and diminish human 
essence, which is key to the idea of humanness. In this sense, when we appeal to humanity in 
a motivational capacity, we are most often implicitly making reference to a dual conception of 
humanity, one that combines ideas of human interconnectedness with the individual 
characteristics of human nature. It is the way in which mass atrocity crimes supposedly 
challenge both these separate concepts of humanity simultaneously, that consequently 
reinforces the moral aversion shared by so many across the globe to the inherent wrong of such 
crimes. In this regard, addressing the problem of being human requires us to consider ‘the 
processes by which those who are “outside” the human family become fully human and to 
whom dignity is accorded’ (Weinert 2015, p. 27).  The strength of humanity as a concept 
relevant to the R2P therefore lies in its ability to locate individual crimes within a collective 
framework of harm, whereby the defence of humanity can then be framed as a key objective 
for the international community at large. 
 
However, there also remain those who directly question the value of appeals to any form of 
common humanity. As Ilana Feldman & Miriam Ticktin (2001, p. 1) highlight, any claim to be 
speaking on behalf of humanity is often one that is attempting to go beyond the categories of 
political, religious and social divides, in order to assert a fundamentally powerful universal 
 
	  
position. Despite the assumed neutrality that is implied by the concept, an understanding of 
what humanity specifically represents and how we can define it is still severely contested. Due 
to the almost limitless interpretations of what humanity consists of it can often appear as though 
we should simply dismiss the concept all together, as ultimately an empty signifier; where 
despite universal claims to its ability to encompass all human beings, it is in fact ‘so 
historically, geographically situated, as to have no meaning beyond its particular instantiation’ 
(Feldman & Ticktin 2010, p. 2). Accordingly, one is reminded of Carl Schmidt’s (2007, p. 54) 
famous critique in which he argued that ‘whoever invokes humanity wants to cheat’ and as 
such appeals to humanity can only open up the space for further inhumanity carried out in its 
name. This line of thought has led many to suggest that appeals to humanity are mostly used 
in a way that ‘obscures that lives are valued differently’ (Butler 2009, p. 50) and thus the 
imperative that is triggered by appeals to humanity is used to mask ‘the complexity of the 
political situations’ in which the term is applied to (Zehfuss 2012, p. 873).  
 
Conversely, what these critiques attack is not necessarily the universal idea of humanity as a 
reflective guide to moral harm, but its role as a rhetorical tool used to legitimate action by state 
leaders, whether morally defensible or not. One must therefore separate out the meaning we 
place on humanity as a moral force for collective harm recognition and the belief that an appeal 
to humanity assumes the imposition of universal actions of protection. In this regard, 
humanity’s relation to the politics of intervention practices is one that will often be defined by 
a diversity of legitimate but potentially conflicting ethical considerations (Lu 2007, p. 945); 
but that does not equate to the idea that humanity should simply be thought of as devoid of 
value or merit. This is present in the very critiques of the use of humanity outlined above, since 
it is clear that by resisting dominant universal narratives about humanity, they themselves posit 
a different categorisation of humanity as embedded in a universal condition of pluralism, which 
 
	  
when taken seriously, acts as a common element shared by human beings writ large from which 
normative value should be attached.  
 
The need to therefore acknowledge a separation in humanity’s meaning can be best 
encapsulated by the language connected to its moral application. In this sense, whether or not 
we have a shared ideal of unconditional common humanity or agree on the actions performed 
in its name, the fact that we bring up the question of “should we act” in the face of mass atrocity 
crimes in the first place, assumes that we do have some moral ideals and principles, by which 
we recognise and condemn certain acts as inhuman (Luban 2002, p. 99). Without a form of 
shared moral concept, the question of should we act in the face of mass atrocity crimes simply 
would not arise. Consequently, one can highlight how the concept of humanity has been 
constructed through language to form an essential part of our ability to define universal human 
harms. In this sense, it is important to acknowledge how even those who commit acts, 
considered as against humanity, frame their actions and motivations through an understanding 
of who is or isn’t included in humanity. This is most often highlighted by the dehumanising 
language used by perpetrators, through the use of phrases such as ‘rats’ (Holocaust), 
‘cockroaches’ (Rwanda Genocide) and ‘maggots’ (Uganda Cultural Revolution) to refer to 
victims. This is demonstrative of how the language of humanity is deeply embedded in our 
understanding of specific mass atrocity crimes, which are made obvious not only to the 
potential intervener, but also to those committing such crimes in the first place. Subsequently, 
the concept of humanity is arguably central to the language of mass atrocity, whereby appeals 
to the concept are heavily embedded in our thought processes. When we see mass atrocity 
crimes and label them as such, we are already acting and believing in the concept of humanity. 
Thus, what remains central to our understanding of humanity is its role in reinforcing an 
assumed moral wrong found within the actions of the perpetrators, and thus generating a harm 
 
	  
that can be seen to transcend traditional sovereign borders. Yet, the extent to which the concept 
can provide more than a reflective point of reference for locating universal harm remains 
fundamentally contested. 
 
Consequently, whilst the concept of humanity plays a central role in grounding our ability to 
locate the limits of human action and categorise certain crimes accordingly, it also remains 
critical to our understanding of what moral responsibilities states owe to those beyond their 
borders. In investigating this link more closely the chapter will next address the theoretical 
bond made between the concept of humanity and the R2P, in order to outline the role humanity 
plays in supporting a moral obligation for the international community to protect those 
threatened by mass atrocity crimes. In this sense, humanity is used to ground the concept of a 
wider international community, one that is able to recognise the idea ‘that community is equally 
relevant internationally as it is domestically’ (Bulley 2010, p. 447). This is the normative 
ambition that is subsequently fused into the creation of the R2P, placing the concept of 
humanity front and centre in its role as the guiding motivational force for action. The next 
section will therefore outline how these motivational elements have been drawn together within 
the construction of the R2P, and highlight the specific points of tension between the R2P’s 
normative commitment to humanity and the creation of its pragmatic framework in the 2005 
WSOD. 
 
Humanity and the Construction of R2P’s Moral Framework 
The R2P must be understood first and foremost as a commitment born out of previous inaction 
by the international community, in responding to genocides and mass atrocities across the 
globe. The starting point for reflection on these serious moral failings can subsequently be 
brought back to the aftermath of the Holocaust, in which states were in agreement that lessons 
 
	  
must be learnt and the mistakes of the past never repeated, in order for the crime of genocide 
to be outlawed once and for all. Consequently, as Adrian Gallagher (2013, p. 94) argues, it was 
the ‘moral abhorrence felt toward the Holocaust’ that dramatically altered ‘international 
society’s moral, constitutional and legal expectations’, resulting in the establishment of the 
1948 Genocide Convention. For the first time genocide was understood as an international 
concern, whereby states now recognised a legal obligation to override the rights of sovereignty 
wherever genocide was committed (Gallagher 2013, p. 115). Yet despite the initial moral 
outrage created by the crimes of the Holocaust, the events of the following decades would 
provide little support to the possibility of realising “never again”. The response of the 
international community to the genocides of Rwanda and Bosnia demonstrated a lack of 
support for the principles underlying the Genocide Convention, as well as a general 
indifference in regard to the moral obligations states owe to those outside of their borders. The 
consistent failure to make the most conscience shocking crimes of greatest concern to states 
therefore drew many to call for a change in the way international society went about its 
approach to mass atrocity crime prevention and response.  
 
Accordingly, it is still the symbolic language of “never again” that arguably gives R2P much 
of its moral authority in international affairs and thus underpins a key motivational element of 
the concept. The language of “never again” must therefore be understood in relation to the 
concept of common humanity, whereby mass atrocity crimes are considered so shocking to our 
collective humanity that we must all pledge to never let such crimes occur again. It is in relation 
to this moral framework that the R2P can be viewed as ‘essentially a narrative of guilt on the 
part of dissident former UN diplomats’, utilised in order to help ‘operationalize moral 
determinism more effectively’ (Lucas 2014, p. 37). Whilst this particular reading may be 
rejected by some R2P advocates (Bellamy 2013), the statement does highlight how significant 
 
	  
political failures of the past are very much interspersed within the very moral fabric of the 
concept. Thus, as Stephen Hopgood (2014, p. 182) argues, ‘The politics of the R2P are 
intimately interwoven with the politics of stopping genocide’ in which ‘it was the ghosts of 
Rwanda and Srebrenica that haunted advocates’. Nevertheless, the R2P does claim to provide 
a new focus to debates regarding humanitarian intervention, whereby states are now tied to a 
stronger moral obligation and must work harder to both prevent and react to mass atrocity 
crimes across the globe. Consequently, its many supporters (Evans 2009; Peters 2009) describe 
the R2P as representing a fundamental shift in state practice; whereby the failures of the past 
will no longer be played out again and again.  
 
Nonetheless, one must also recognise that long before the creation of the R2P, states were 
forced to wrestle with a variety of obligations and responsibilities to not only humanity, but to 
the management of international peace and security, domestic actors, as well as the influence 
of material factors, when weighing up the case for action. Often the cacophony of voices 
pulling and pushing from each side resulted in deadlock or indifference from the international 
community. This failure to act was therefore seen as representative of a moral inadequacy of 
states, whereby state actors were fundamentally unable to recognise the responsibilities they 
supposedly had to those threatened by such “conscience shocking crimes”. As Secretary-
General Ban Ki-moon reinforced in his 2012 R2P report, the tragic events of the past were 
underlined by the profound failure of ‘individual states to live up to their responsibilities and 
obligations under international law, as well as the collective inadequacies of international 
institutions’. Consequently, if we understand the R2P as a moral imperative derived from our 
‘common humanity’ (Welsh 2014, p. 127), then to what extent can the normative ambition of 
humanity be utilised by the R2P, in an attempt to better reinforce moral responsibilities for 
states? As this section highlights, the complex relationship between the foundational moral 
 
	  
principle of humanity and its influence on the R2P’s ability to forge greater state responsibility, 
is still one defined by political contestation. In tracing the development of the R2P one can 
therefore highlight how appeals to a collective obligation of protection have often resulted in 
the theoretical stretching of humanity’s motivational influence.  
 
ICISS 
What is perhaps most significant about the formulation of the ICISS report is the decision to 
specifically build the concept of R2P around direct appeals to a common humanity. As Jennifer 
Welsh (2012) acknowledges, whilst the construction of the R2P in the 2001 ICISS document 
is based upon the idea of securing individual rights that are denied by persecution and violence, 
the responsibility of states to intervene to protect these rights are built around the collective 
idea of a common humanity. In this sense, the document is grounded on a moral imperative, 
by which certain crimes are seen to ‘affect us all collectively, through the international harm 
principle’ (Welsh 2012, p. 105). As the ICISS (2001, p. 75) proposal states, ‘all human beings 
are equally entitled to be protected from acts that shock the conscience of us all’. The reasoning 
behind this principle therefore stipulates that humanity itself can be damaged by mass atrocity 
crimes, generating a ‘moral responsibility for members of the international community to act’ 
(Welsh 2012, p. 105). Due to the severity of the crimes committed the responsibility generated 
by the R2P is then shifted upwards to the international level. This conception of R2P’s moral 
framework has continued to define the approach taken by advocates when explaining how the 
R2P can generate consensus for protection. In this sense the R2P is often understood as ‘the 
normative instrument of choice for converting a shocked international conscience into decisive 




Correspondingly, as Michael Doyle (2015, p. 7) highlights, the R2P therefore attempts to 
‘redefine and broaden’ the standard for authorization of force, Chapter VII’s “international 
peace and security” clause, reflecting a desire to draw more attention to the effects mass 
atrocity crimes can have beyond their domestic impact. The motivation for the expansion of 
this understanding must be understood in relation to the concept of humanity. This is articulated 
by the argument that mass atrocity crimes pose the most serious threat to the very ideals 
humanity is built upon; ‘Nothing has done more harm to our shared ideal that we are all equal 
in worth and dignity, and that the earth is our common home than the inability of the 
community of states to prevent genocide, massacre and ethnic cleansing’ (ICISS 2001, p. 75). 
The ICISS report explicitly states a need to ‘strengthen the prospects for obtaining action…. in 
response to conscience-shocking situations of great humanitarian need’ (ICISS 2001, p. 74). 
This statement again reinforces the centrality of the moral principle of humanity to the 
motivational strength of the overall R2P concept. Preventing and reacting effectively to mass 
atrocity crimes must therefore be considered a universal goal for the international community, 
based upon the importance of human dignity to the management of international society. 
Humanity in this sense provides an ability to theoretically locate the harm caused by mass 
atrocity crimes as well as define a moral obligation for states to protect and prevent such crimes. 
However, the scope of the international community’s moral responsibility to act in such 
situations has continued to be a key point of contestation, whereby states have often firmly 
rejected the link made between the identification of mass atrocity crimes as a threat to collective 
humanity, and the subsequent call for humanity to be protected. 
 
World Summit Outcome Document 
In the years following the ICISS report, the R2P concept experienced a number of key setbacks 
in its development, most notably the changing security environment post-9/11, resulting in the 
 
	  
highly controversial US led Iraq intervention (Weiss 2006). Yet, despite these initial setbacks, 
the R2P was able to gain considerable momentum during the 2005 Secretary General’s High 
Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, and following these negotiations states agreed 
to endorse a more refined principle of R2P in the WSOD. For supporters of the R2P, the 2005 
WSOD was a major watershed moment in which the tragedies of the past had finally forced an 
‘historic shift in international relations’ reinforcing the idea of a ‘moral obligation to prevent 
and halt the most horrific crimes known to humankind’ (Schmidt & Wolf 2012). However, as 
C.S.R. Murthy & Gerrit Kurtz (2016, p. 42) acknowledge, the disparate normative perspectives 
of contrasting states resulted in considerable contestation over agreement to the new 
formalisation of the R2P. Consequently, what emerged from the eventual agreement has often 
been referred to as “R2P lite” (Weiss 2007, p. 117), due to the fact the agreement did not 
fundamentally address the issue of political will, particularly in regard to how the Council 
could move beyond deadlock in mass atrocity crime situations. 
 
The construction of the R2P within the 2005 WSOD therefore acknowledged a specific 
pragmatic understanding of when states should have the responsibility to act. This obligation 
was expressed as being on a strict ‘case by case’ basis. In this regard, the R2P was specifically 
set up to balance various imperatives and procedural considerations, and thus in many ways 
contradicts the form in which the R2P was originally presented in previous discussions (Paris 
2014, p. 579). As Peter Hipold (2006, p. 65) argues, very little remained in the 2005 WSOD 
from the bold designs developed by the ICISS, and the HLP report. The agreement therefore 
underwent a number of significant changes to its language in which to help build international 
consensus (Bellamy 2006, p. 143). Thus, as Carsten Stahn (2007, p. 109) has highlighted, the 
strict conditions placed on the ability of states to use force clearly distinguished the WSOD 
from the more responsibility-driven approach of the previous ICISS report on collective 
 
	  
security, and reflects the views of those states against the imposition of ‘any legal obligation 
for Security Council members to support enforcement action in the case of mass atrocities’. In 
response to such demands, Paragraph 139 of the WSOD firmly locates the responsibility to 
protect within the framework of the Security Council and its powers under Chapter VII, and 
thus ‘does not provide any new legal obligations on the part of states to prevent or respond to 
atrocities’ (Welsh 2009, p. 4).  
 
This reframing of the R2P within the 2005 WSOD agreement has since been described as a 
move to narrow the possibilities of implementing collective responsibility, whereby it is ‘no 
longer the challenging framework of common humanity which creates the moral responsibility, 
but rather the specific political commitment of states to act through the UN to address potential 
or real atrocities’ (Welsh & Banda 2010, p. 225). The 2005 WSOD is argued by Lars Waldorf 
(2016, p. 56) to have shifted the focus from ‘moral judgments about what shocks the conscience 
of humanity (ICISS 2001) to legal determinations about what violates international criminal 
law’ and is thus seen to a have replaced ‘subjective moral judgments (and selective political 
decisions) with something more consensual and more consistent’. This reading of humanity’s 
changing role in relation to the R2P is significant and in many ways reflects how consensus 
was built through watering down the language of moral obligations in order to craft a pragmatic 
framework for action, which rejects the need to locate a higher authority above the state system. 
Whilst it may appear as simply a vital move away from the emotive language of the ICISS 
document, in order to put into place a more rigid and workable doctrine, it also represents a 
significant rejection of the idea that the R2P can reshape the current global political system 
(Hopgood 2014, p. 193). In this sense, it reinforces the idea that an obligation for the 
international community is one that sits at the sovereign level, whereby humanity as a moral 




The 2005 agreement must therefore be understood as reinforcing existing but fragile state 
agreement as to the potential of mass atrocity crimes to threaten international peace and 
security, rather than an attempt to create a distinctly new responsibility founded in the respect 
of human dignity and common humanity. As a consequence, states do still face what Adrian 
Gallagher (2012, p. 343) has referred to as a “clash of responsibilities” ‘between the 
international responsibility of states to assist other states and the national responsibility of 
states to pursue survival within anarchy’. Based upon these terms, it makes sense to classify 
the R2P as representative of a distinctly pragmatic framework of protection, defined by a ‘duty 
of conduct’ which at a minimum generates a “responsibility to consider” the appropriate action 
concerning all incidents of mass atrocity crimes (Welsh 2013). Whilst this more pragmatic 
interpretation of the R2P is clearly an attempt to shrink down the influence of moral 
obligations, the framing of a theoretical ‘responsibility to consider’ must also be understood 
and interpreted through the language of common humanity, which informs our ability to 
recognise why we should consider the harm of mass atrocity crimes in the first place.  
 
Nevertheless, this normative shift does also open up further space for states to contest and 
reinterpret the moral demands created by humanity, and ultimately to challenge the link made 
between the process of threat identification and the corresponding obligation to act. In this 
regard, the moral demand for protection on behalf of a common humanity is one that is 
continually internalised within the confines of the political, and as such, the scope of the moral 
obligations attached to the concept are continually reshaped by the system of sovereign states. 
Subsequently, rather than see humanity as a moral benchmark in which state action must aspire 
to, it is much more the case that the normative power of humanity provides a tool for driving 
action and critique, that is consistently manipulated by states, in an attempt to define the limits 
 
	  
of moral concern. As Michael Barnett (2002, p. 181) has argued, what this may suggest is that 
the very institutions and concepts that we develop in order to create higher humanitarian ends 
can still often ‘generate ethical principles that are disconnected from those in whose name they 
act’. Thus, the creation of the 2005 R2P agreement provides a normative space in which states 
can now more easily consider and define the political scope of protection on behalf of 
humanity, but this process of increased reflection does not necessarily correspond with the 
ability of the R2P to supposedly shift emotional shock and outrage into collective action on 
behalf of others. 
 
Taking Stock – 10 Years of the R2P 
In the ten years since its official adoption, the R2P has been applied to a number of prominent 
mass atrocity cases, most notably the 2011 Libyan intervention, as well as its role in supporting 
more limited intervention and prevention practices in Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea and Kenya. Yet at 
the same time the R2P has also been unable to generate sufficient political interest or 
consensus, as to the need for protection, in cases including Syria, Sri Lanka and Sudan. This 
mixed picture of the R2P in its first decade of existence requires one to begin questioning the 
influence of the moral framework underpinning the R2P, and its role in grounding the scope of 
state obligations. Taking stock of the current R2P ‘balance sheet’ (Evans 2011), one can 
certainly highlight evidence of a continual process of R2P language becoming further 
embedded and commonplace within Security Council resolutions. As Jess Gifkins (2016, p. 
13) highlights, ‘R2P has been regularly reaffirmed in a wide array of conflicts and thematic 
issues’. Yet in spite of this changing reality, there still remains a considerable lack of consensus 
surrounding the moral obligations for protection, and in particular, discussions concerning the 
hierarchy of when and where the protection of humanity must be reinforced. For Aidan Hehir 
(2016, p. 171), the lack of Pillar III engagement has been a consistent feature of R2P 
 
	  
discussions, and has arguably increased since the invocation of R2P language in regard to the 
2011 Libya intervention, following which, members have continued to hold diverse views on 
how Pillar III can be applied and when certain criteria demand its application (Morris 2016). 
This contestation has certainly not gone unnoticed and has as such remained a significant point 
of concern following the continuation of the Syrian crisis, as well as relatively inadequate 
responses by the UN to situations in Central African Republic and Burundi (Cinq-Mars 2016; 
Rugiririza 2016). Subsequently, the impact of the motivational force of humanity and its 
relation to the R2P has become a key point of discussion once again, in particular, the need to 
question how it can influence state decision making in mass atrocity crime situations (Tacheva 
& Brown 2015).  
 
In the 2015 UN Secretary General Report on the R2P, Ban Ki-moon (2015) engaged directly 
with the apparent tension between the pragmatic and moral frameworks embedded within the 
R2P concept and most significantly, the role of humanity as a central normative element of the 
R2P. The document states that despite the 2005 WSOD calling on the Security Council to 
address atrocity crimes on a case-by-case basis, ‘the Council’s inconsistent response to 
situations featuring genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity 
continues to affect the standing of the responsibility to protect’ (p. 13). Subsequently it is 
argued that, ‘the Security Council has too often failed to live up to its global responsibility and 
find a common purpose, allowing narrower strategic interests to impede consensus and 
preclude a robust collective response’ (p. 13). This common purpose is expressed through the 
distinctive harms created by the crimes of R2P, which are understood as ‘a deep affront to 
humanity, to the very dignity of human beings’ (p. 6). The concept of humanity is thus 
underlined as critical to building consensus as to the scope of the crimes that define the R2P as 
well as providing the key motivational force to compel states to drastically shift their 
 
	  
behaviour. As the report goes on to outline, a key priority for the future must be making sure 
the protection of populations is ‘elevated above political and strategic interests’ (p. 16). The 
key to achieving this lies in the ability of states to recognise the R2P as an ‘enduring 
obligation’, whereby the responsibilities it creates cannot be turned on and off by states (p. 18). 
All this adds up to an enhanced pressure on states to make atrocity crime prevention and 
response a priority.  
 
Whilst the R2P clearly remains a work in progress, Ban Ki-moon’s harsh words against the 
current practices of the Security Council highlight a strained relationship between humanity’s 
moral demand for protection and the ability of the R2P to compel states to shift their behaviour 
accordingly. The complex relationship between humanity and the R2P therefore remains far 
from resolved. Subsequently, if the UN had the moral capacity to act in the cases of Rwanda 
and Srebrenica but failed to, can we confidently point to a different response in such situations 
in the future? The ability to fully address this question therefore requires the continuation of a 
more systematic engagement with the moral foundations of the R2P, in order to assess how 
normative concepts such as humanity influence the framing of the obligations states are 
believed to hold. Thus if we accept that the R2P does not place any higher law-like restraints 
on the actions of the Security Council, then to what extent can normative obligations created 
by the notion of humanity compete ‘in the sphere of “politics”, the world of everyday decision-
making’ (Hopgood 2014, p. 193)? 
 
Conclusion 
In a 2013 speech on the future of R2P, Gareth Evans stated his strong belief that ‘the imperative 
of our common humanity will eventually prevail’. With the growing traction of the R2P 
concept across the globe, demonstrated by numerous UN resolutions and continued 
 
	  
institutional support, advocates have since articulated similar sentiments (Bellamy 2014; 
Dunne 2013). Yet by focusing on humanity as a higher moral cause driving future progress, it 
is often easy to overlook the complexity of its current normative interaction with the R2P, and 
its role as a central motivational component for the doctrine. Subsequently, the chapter has 
sought to address this significant lacuna in the current R2P literature, in which appeals to the 
concept of humanity and its relationship to the R2P have remained considerably under 
theorised. A significant impact of this oversight has been to view the development of the R2P 
as one that follows a linear path of progression, dictated by the higher moral good of humanity. 
This framing of humanity’s normative role has therefore often led advocates to overstate 
humanity’s role in helping the R2P convert emotional shock and outrage into collective action.  
 
The limitations of the R2P in helping to reinforce this conversion process can be reflected on 
through revisiting a critical statement from the 2001 ICISS report, in which it was argued that, 
‘for all the rhetoric about the universality of human rights some human lives end up mattering 
a great deal less to the international community than others’ (ICISS, p. 1). In the 15 years since 
this report, states have continued to contest the scope of their zones of moral concern, in which 
the hierarchy of human life has remained a consistent challenge to the universal ambitions of 
the R2P. Subsequently, it is vital to reflect on the processes through which those who are 
currently dehumanised can become recognised as fully human (Weinert 2015, p. 2). The 
politics of forging such agreement is therefore the arena in which the normative and 
motivational capacity of humanity must compete. Yet whilst the R2P can never be a quick fix 
to the problems of collective morality in the current state system, we must be prepared to more 
critically engage with the wider normative tensions that remain apparent in the R2P’s 
construction. Attempts to bypass or overlook the normative elements of such debates will only 
allow for further confusion, as a supposedly uncontested moral principle continues to provide 
 
	  
contrasting results. Consequently, whilst the concept of humanity is so often left under-
theorised in the literature, there continues to be a tendency to overstate its apparent influence 
on generating consensus for responding to humanitarian crisis. In order to further address this 
oversight, it is vital that both academics and practitioners continue to reflect on how the 
language and moral demands created by humanity are internalised by states, and ultimately 
begin to challenge assumptions as to the ease from which its function as a generator of moral 
concern, can in fact fully translate to effective consensus and response, during mass atrocity 
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